Heinz Hermann proposes a new paradigm, conceptual continuity, as a means of comparing systems of differing complexity. He argues that the principles of general abstraction that are used to create unifying theories in the physical sciences are not applicable to biological and sociopolitical systems, because the latter exist at differing levels of complexity. This supposition is a use - ful one and may turn out to be very competitive with theories propounded by those attempting to create a unifying interdisciplinary theory of complexity. However, the author may have gone beyond his level of expertise in sociopolitics, history and economics in trying to present this idea to the public. A good portion of the book consists of Hermann’s labored attempts to explain sociopolitical history in terms of complexity. He does not appear to be the right person for this undertaking, assuming that such a person exists.
More Heat than Light, a book written by Philip Mirowski a decade ago, lampoons the economics profession for basing an entire philosophy, neoclassical economic theory, on a “corrupted” version of Newtonian physics. Hermann’s contribution is more or less in the same vein, but without the satire and the mathematics accompanying Mirowski’s book. It is an argument that not only are we unable to create a universal, interdisciplinary complexity theory with a unifying foundation such as may be done in the physical sciences, but that one cannot do this even within disciplines or fields of study. He maintains that there are simply too many levels of complexity in organisms and societies to unify principles into grand theories, so we should simply search for differing levels of conceptual continuity.
Complexity science is an interdisciplinary study that is still in its infancy. There are many versions of complexity theory, perhaps almost as many as there are people studying it. In particular interpretations a relationship to the chaos theory of the physical sciences is obvious. Some authors’ versions offer a generalized, but still rather sparsely developed notion of an entirely new theory, and in some renditions complexity is used merely to describe things that are very complicated and not well understood. Hermann does not truly define his concept of complexity theory until he reaches Chapter 4, where he ties it to postmodern philosophy as well as chaos theory and biological notions of complexity This chapter is clearly his best, drawing on his life’s work as an academic biologist, venturing out somewhat into interdisciplinary studies and philosophy, but not getting out on a scrawny tree limb, so to speak, as he does in other chapters. One discipline that he does not discuss here is mathematics and the reader is left wondering why he does not. In fact, there is almost no discussion of mathematics in the entire book and very little mention of dynamics.
From Biology to Sociopolitics does not address management and organizational phenomena outside of the realm of sociopolitics. One who believes Hermann’s thesis to be correct might easily generalize his notions to these areas, however.
A certain amount of nonproductive work is inevitable when searching the frontiers of knowledge, just as a certain number of dry holes are expected when drilling for oil in areas where there are no producing wells. Most of Hermann’s monograph consists of dry holes. He attemps to explain something that he calls “sociopolitics” by providing a history of societies and political systems from ancient Greece to modern democracy, with gratuitous shots at National Socialism and communism— which are far too easy targets—in between. His point is that sociopolitic systems vary in their levels of complexity, but the analysis he provides is too superficial for a proper historical treatment of thousands of years of human political organization, and too much of a distraction from his thesis to be of great value to the reader. He would have fared better had he cast a wider historical net and then distilled his entire discussion of sociopolitics into one or two chapters.
From a social science vantage point, which is what this reviewer brings to the table, Hermann’s book is best understood in contrast to another book: Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up (1996) by Joshua Epstein and Robert Axtell. This work attempts to provide a unifying theory for social science based on notions of complexity. The style and content of these two books are very different, the latter being very mathematical and statistical. Nevertheless, those who are willing to read Hermann’s thesis should also read Epstein and Axtell and determine for themselves whose work is more helpful on the issue of whether the creation of unifying theories is valid in disciplines other than the physical sciences in order to understand complex systems.
HENRY E. KILPATRICK
Epstein, Joshua M. and Axtell, Robert (1996) Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press.
Mirowski, Philip (1989) More Heat than Light, NY: Cambridge University Press.